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A FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK
EXTERNALITIES
MARIAGIOVANNA BACCARA, AYSE IMROHOROGLU,
ALISTAIR J. WILSON, AND LEEAT YARIV
Abstract. We study the eﬀects of network externalities on a
unique matching protocol for faculty in a large U.S. professional
school to oﬃces in a new building. We collected institutional, web,
and survey data on faculty’s attributes and choices. We ﬁrst iden-
tify the diﬀerent layers of the social network: institutional aﬃlia-
tions, coauthorships, and friendships. We demonstrate and quan-
tify the eﬀects of network externalities on choices and outcomes.
Furthermore, we disentangle the diﬀerent layers of the social net-
work and estimate their relative impact. Finally, we assess the
matching protocol from a welfare perspective. Our study suggests
the importance and feasibility of accounting for network external-
ities in general assignment problems and evaluates a set of tech-
niques that can be employed to this end.
JEL classiﬁcation: D02, D61, D62, D85, C93.
Keywords: Matching, Social Networks, Externalities.
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview. Externalities are commonplace within assignment pro 
cesses: In the housing market, the value of a property depends on the
demographics of neighboring homeowners. In an oligopolistic market,
the returns from joining one ﬁrm depend on the composition of rivals.
In universities, the desirability of a speciﬁc dorm room may depend on
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the peers in nearby rooms. In politics, the beneﬁt from joining a partic 
ular party or coalition varies with the other political alliances formed.
In team sports, the value in joining one team depends on the quality
of other teams’ players. And so on and so forth. Despite the wide
range of applications featuring externalities, the matching literature,
both positive and prescriptive, has largely ignored their presence.
1
One of the signiﬁcant challenges in assessing the role of externalities
is that the underlying networks generating them are often unobserv 
able or diﬃcult to pin down. In particular, while attributes such as
income, professional qualiﬁcation, and education are frequently avail 
able, other important measurements of social connection—friendship,
a shared professional history, etc.—are more diﬃcult to obtain. Be 
yond the scarcity of data, the matching literature lacks a deﬁnitive
framework that accounts for externalities, while still enabling empiri 
cal evaluations.
The current paper uses unique ﬁeld data from a centralized assign-
ment process in which connections between individuals were mapped at
both the professional and social level. Speciﬁcally, our data originate
from a matching process that assigned faculty members from a U.S.
professional school to newly renovated oﬃces. Using web and survey
sources, we identify the institutional, coauthorship, and friendship net 
works of associations between the faculty involved.
Our study has three goals: First, to provide an empirical account
of the eﬀects of externalities resulting from agents’ connections in as 
signment processes on behavior and outcomes; Second, to assess the
diﬀering networks’ relative eﬀects;
2 Third, to evaluate the eﬃciency
of matching protocols in terms of welfare, accounting for the identiﬁed
externalities. As a by product, our analysis suggests and appraises sev 
eral econometric and computational techniques for estimating network
externalities.
Our data describe the matching process and ﬁnal assignment of 73
faculty into oﬃces. The oﬃces vary in their physical attributes—in
particular, elevation, geographical exposure, and size, as well as their
position and spatial relation to other oﬃces. School oﬃcials designed
a serial dictatorship matching protocol in which faculty members were
coarsely ranked into four tiers according to career seniority, those with
1For several exceptions, see the literature review below.
2Most existing work estimating peer eﬀects elicits one layer of interactions (be
it social, professional, or geographical). In our study, we allow the data to speak as
to which of the network layers matters and to what extent. For some related work,
see Conley and Udry (2010) and Kremer and Miguel (2007) discussed in Section
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the greatest seniority choosing ﬁrst, where the order of choice within
each seniority level was determined by a random draw. Based on the
resulting order, each faculty member was called upon in sequence to
select an oﬃce from those remaining, having observed all preceding
selections. After the selection process was completed, faculty were free
to trade oﬃces, and, additionally, were permitted to use transfers from
their research budgets to facilitate trades.
In this environment, the externalities across agents can be easily
mapped and separated into three layers of a social network. The ﬁrst
is institutional: the faculty members are divided into departments. The
second social network is mapped using the past and current coauthor-
ship links between faculty members. This network provides an alterna 
tive map of professional proximity, in which links between individuals
were not incumbent on institutional aﬃliation or choice of research in 
terest, but allowed to arise spontaneously through a bilateral choice.
Finally, making use of a survey, we map a third social network, the
social interactions and friendships between faculty members.
Our analysis follows several stages. As a preliminary step, we esti 
mate an array of discrete choice models in which, at each decision node,
a faculty member chooses from a menu of oﬃces, and decides based on
each oﬃce’s physical attributes, as well as the network characteristics
at the time of choice (for example, the number of coauthors located
nearby). If network eﬀects play no role in choice, the corresponding
network elements in our model should have no weight. However, all of
our speciﬁcations generate signiﬁcant network eﬀects—in fact, the esti 
mates suggest that network eﬀects have a comparable impact to those
of physical attributes. Nonetheless, this approach, while standard, is
tantamount to assuming that faculty are myopic, ignoring the impli 
cations of their choices on their peers’ subsequent selections. In that
respect, while we reject the hypothesis that networks have no impact
on choice, the magnitude of these eﬀects should be interpreted care 
fully. This leads us to more closely inspect the dynamic and strategic
aspects of the matching process.
In order to quantify the magnitudes of network sorting eﬀects on
outcomes, while accounting for the strategic aspects present during the
matching process, we compare the observed assignment to a counter 
factual in which faculty choose oﬃces based only on physical attributes.
Using the sequence in which faculty made decisions, we examine the
outcomes that would result were faculty to locate solely on the basis
of oﬃces’ physical characteristics—for instance, preferring oﬃces on
higher ﬂoors to lower ones, larger oﬃces to smaller ones, etc. Where
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characteristics, we assume one oﬃce is chosen randomly from the sub 
set. This allows us to simulate the resulting network ‘clustering’ (for
several preference speciﬁcations over oﬃces’ physical attributes) and
compare it to that observed in the data.3 The results from this com 
parison suggest that oﬃce proximity among linked individuals (both at
the ﬂoor and oﬃce neighbor level) occurs signiﬁcantly more frequently
in the observed assignment than in the simulated ones. Speciﬁcally,
in the simulated assignments, members of the same department, coau 
thors, and friends are on the same ﬂoor at least 8%, 36%, and 30%
less often than in our data, respectively. Similarly, proximity of oﬃce
neighbors from every network layer were lower by 21%–59%. From a
general perspective, these results are illustrative, in both signiﬁcance
and magnitude, of the potential importance of network externalities on
assignment outcomes.
Next, we disentangle the relative importance of each of the three
network layers. In particular, we are interested in separating the ef 
fects of the institutional network, generated by department aﬃliation,
from the idiosyncratic choice networks, described by coauthorships and
friendships.
As mentioned before, following the sequential choice process, faculty
were allowed to exchange their allocated oﬃces using transfers between
their research budgets. This allows us to deﬁne a simple notion of sta 
bility pertaining to the ﬁnal assignment (after all swaps were carried
out). We say that an assignment is pairwise stable with transfers if
there is no trade in oﬃce assignments between two faculty members
that results, with a transfer, in an improvement for both faculty, keep 
ing all other oﬃce assignments ﬁxed. We show that pairwise stable
assignments exist when utilities are such that: (i) the eﬀects of oﬃces’
physical attributes are common across faculty and separable from net 
work eﬀects; and (ii) network eﬀects are symmetric across linked indi 
viduals and separably additive (for example, utilities depend linearly
on the number of peers that are within the relevant neighborhood).4
3This is sometimes referred to as a dartboard approach in the context of spatial
econometrics, see Ellison and Glaeser (1997), Guimarães, Figueiredo, and Wood-
ward (2009), and Head and Reis (2005).
4This is interesting from a theoretical perspective. Indeed, the literature on
matching with externalities has mostly concentrated on existence of stable out-
comes. As discussed in the literature review below, the diﬃculty arises due to the
freedom one has in specifying beliefs over other players’ reactions upon deviation.
Our notion essentially entails myopic beliefs about the swaps that ensue. This
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Pairwise stability (with transfers) entails a sequence of constraints
corresponding to all faculty pairs in our data. Using techniques de 
veloped recently for matching games without externalities (Bajari and
Fox, 2010 and Fox, 2010), we estimate utility parameters for each of our
network layers. We ﬁnd that the coauthorship network has a greater
impact than both the institutional and the friendship networks, where
we ﬁnd the latter to have a negligible eﬀect. Nonetheless, the interac 
tion between coauthorship and friendship has a sizable eﬀect on prefer 
ences. Beyond the relevance to the matching process per se, this obser 
vation highlights the importance of studying the appropriate network
of connections when examining peer eﬀects. From a methodological
perspective, these estimations underscore the importance of account 
ing for strategic behavior in dynamic matching markets. Indeed, the
relative magnitudes of our estimates are diﬀerent than those we achieve
using standard discrete choice models, which, as stressed above, omit
the forward looking strategic aspects.
Given the signiﬁcance of externalities in individuals’ utilities, it is
interesting to contemplate the design of eﬃcient assignments. In prin 
ciple, designing the most eﬃcient assignment is a complex problem
due to the vast number of possible assignments (73! > 10105 in our
data set).5 As it turns out, designing the most eﬃcient assignment for
a class of preferences allowing for network externalities (that encom 
passes those we estimate) is a special case of the quadratic assignment
problem (see Koopmans and Beckman, 1957). While generally diﬃcult
computationally, and subject of an active line of investigation in oper 
ations research, we show how new techniques, still unexploited in the
economics literature, can be used to approximate an optimal assign 
ment.
Under our assumptions that the utilities from oﬃces’ physical at 
tributes are shared across faculty and are separable from network char 
acteristics, utilitarian eﬃciency is inﬂuenced only through the network
eﬀects present in our population. In fact, given our utility speciﬁca 
tion and the estimation results, any assignment that would increase the
proximity of members from the diﬀerent network layers would increase
eﬃciency. Using our estimates for the relative preference weights of the
diﬀerent network variables, we can evaluate the eﬃciency of the match 
ing protocol at hand. Namely, we identify an assignment that achieves
5Furthermore, the presence of network externalities makes the problem signif-
icantly more intricate than those pertaining to well-known problems of assigning
goods exhibiting complementarities (e.g., spectrum rights’ auctions).A FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 5
a 183% improvement in network utility relative to the implemented
assignment.
Finally, having identiﬁed individuals’ preferences and an eﬃciency
benchmark, we study some properties of assignment mechanisms. First,
we compare the assignment implemented by the school with the best 
found assignment in terms of fairness across seniority levels and de 
partmental aﬃliations. We ﬁnd that the best found assignment implies
more egalitarian outcomes across seniority, but somewhat less egalitar 
ian outcomes across departments. Second, we consider several com 
monly used versions of the serial dictatorship mechanism (varying the
order in which the individuals choose and banning ex post swaps), and
evaluate their eﬃciency performance. In the presence of externalities,
outcomes appear consistently lower than the socially optimal bench 
mark. From a general institutional design point of view, this analysis
suggests the importance of recognizing and accounting for the under 
lying networks of relevant connections when constructing assignment
mechanisms, and illustrates computational techniques for doing so in
practice.
1.2. Related Literature. The idea that externalities may play a cru 
cial role in group formation appears in some of the recent theoretical
work on cooperative games. The general setup of games that are often
referred to as “partition function games” (Lucas and Thrall, 1963 and
Myerson, 1977) or “global games” (Gilboa and Lehrer, 1991) presumes
that players’ payoﬀs depend on the partition of the population. There
are two general approaches that the literature takes. One strand fo 
cuses on core like or Shapley value notions in which a particular belief
structure (pertaining to the entire population’s reaction to a coalitional
deviation) is imposed (for example, Gilboa and Lehrer, 1991, De Clip 
pel and Serrano, 2008, and Hafalir, 2008). The goal of this literature is
to provide conditions under which the relevant solution concept exists.
The other line of work is more explicitly dynamic in that it proposes
a particular “bargaining protocol” by which coalitions are formed and
analyzes the resulting set of equilibria in terms of eﬃciency and the
pattern of emerging coalitions (see Bloch, 1996, Maskin, 2003, Ray
and Vohra, 1999, and Yi, 1997).
In the context of matching, Sasaki and Toda (1996) illustrate the
large freedom in beliefs upon deviations assuring the existence of stable
matches for any prevailing preferences.6
6The matching literature has also considered diﬀerent types of externalities in
many-to-one matching environments in which agents (say, workers in a ﬁrm, or
students in a school) care about the peers who are assigned with them (but not6 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
Without externalities, there is a large body of theoretical work that
studies housing matching environments similar to ours (starting from
Shapley and Scarf, 1974 and more recently explored in, for example,
Che and Gale, 2009, Ehlers, 2002, Pycia and Ünver, 2007, and refer 
ences therein).7
Empirically, while we are not aware of any studies quantifying the
eﬀects of network externalities in cooperative setups (matching envi 
ronments in particular), the idea that peers may aﬀect behavior and
outcomes has been explored in many realms (see, for instance, Jack 
son, 2008 and Wasserman and Faust, 1994 for references).8 In fact,
recent ﬁeld data suggest diﬀerential eﬀects of multi layered networks
on outcomes (see Conley and Udry, 2010 and Kremer and Miguel,
2007). Another related strand of empirical work considers ﬁeld perfor 
mance of assignment mechanisms, without accounting for externalities
(see Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez, 2006, and references
therein).9
Methodologically, the dartboard approach used in Section 4 to esti 
mate the impact of network externalities on the observed bunching of
connected faculty has been used in other empirical studies on spatial
clustering (for instance, Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, who use a similar
approach to estimate geographic concentration of U.S. manufacturing
industries). The estimations we perform in order to assess the rela 
tive magnitudes of the eﬀects of the diﬀerent layers of the underlying
networks utilize identiﬁcation techniques developed by Bajari and Fox
(2010) and Fox (2010).
Finally, our welfare analysis involves ﬁnding the optimal solution for
a quadratic assignment problem, which dates back to the speciﬁcation
of location assignments with externalities in Koopmans and Beckmann
the entire population assignment). That literature focuses mostly on conditions
under which particular notions of stability generate non-empty predictions. See
Echenique and Yenmez (2007) and Pycia (2009) for details.
7In the no externalities world, there is also a budding literature studying decen-
tralized dynamic matching games in which, similarly to our setting, agents may
consider other agents’ actions when deciding to commit to an irreversible match,
see Niederle and Yariv (2009).
8Several recent papers have mapped friendship networks in order to test for their
eﬀects on behavior in experimental games (for example, Leider, Möbius, Rosenblat,
and Do, 2009 and Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp, and Yariv, 2009).
9For anecdotal evidence on how oﬃce locations impact faculty interactions, see
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(1957). Solving this problem, which is NP hard, is a continuing area of
research within the operations research and combinatorics literatures.10
Several recent papers contain welfare assessments of assignments via
random serial dictatorship without externalities. Manea (2007) char 
acterizes subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of serial dictatorship
procedures for multiple objects, and ﬁnds that outcomes are not gener 
ically eﬃcient, in contrast with the single object case. Budish and
Cantillon (2011) analyze data from a university’s course assignment
process and ﬁnd that the university’s manipulable mechanism provides
an ex ante welfare improvement over the strategy proof and ex post
eﬃcient random serial dictatorship.
Another assignment mechanism extensively studied in the literature
is auctions. Bajari and Fox (2010) analyze the welfare loss in the sale
of FCC spectrum licenses via auctions after constructing estimates of
license complementarities. Again, externalities across diﬀerent bidders’
license assignments are assumed not to be present. Sönmez and Ünver
(2009) discuss the welfare losses caused through auction mechanisms
with endowment of ﬁat currency, demonstrating the failure of these
markets over straightforward statements of ordinal preferences. Kr 
ishna and Ünver (2008) empirically analyze the results from course
assignments with bidding, ﬁnding auctions inferior to a standard Gale 
Shapley mechanism.
2. The Allocation Process
In this section, we describe the details of the matching protocol that
was utilized in the ﬁeld experiment, as well as the components of our
data set.
2.1. The Matching Protocol. In 2006, plans to renovate one build 
ing of a large U.S. professional school were revealed to the faculty. The
renovation would result in 74 vacant oﬃces. Dean level negotiations
produced an initial list of 74 faculty members from 4 departments to
occupy the new building.11
The assignment process used was a random serial dictatorship pro 
cedure. As a ﬁrst step, the school oﬃcials produced a coarse ranking
10Liola, Nair, de Abreu, Boaventura-Netto, Hahn, and Querido (2007) provide
an extensive list of references in the operations research literature and Brandeau
and Chiu (1989) provide a general taxonomy for a planner’s location/assignment
problem.
11Before the renovation, three diﬀerent buildings housed the oﬃces of the
school’s faculty members, with departments assigned to diﬀerent ﬂoors within these
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of the 74 faculty members according to career seniority: priority was
given ﬁrst to chaired professors and department chairs, then full profes 
sors, followed by associate professors and, ﬁnally, assistant professors.
The ordering of faculty within each group was determined by a ran-
dom draw administered by the dean’s oﬃce, under the supervision of
department representatives.
Once the ranking was determined, the faculty members bound for the
new building received a memo providing the complete sequence, as well
as instructions on how the process would evolve. These instructions
indicated that all the oﬃce choices were to be conducted in one day.
Each faculty member was able to see all the choices made up to the
time of his/her own choice. Faculty members who could not be present
on the day of the draft were asked to ﬁll out a proxy form detailing
their preferences and give it to a faculty who would be present.12
Conversations and discussions among the faculty took place prior to
the selections. Faculty members were encouraged to make pre  and
post draft exchanges (prior to the draft, exchanges of rank numbers,
and after the draft, exchanges of oﬃces). Furthermore, faculty were al-
lowed to use funds from their research accounts to facilitate both types
of exchange. Indeed, while no ex ante draft number trades took place,
ex post trades involving 7 oﬃces occurred immediately following the
draft. Speciﬁcally, there were three oﬃce changes observed after the
initial assignment: (i) A bilateral swap; (ii) A swap triggered by one fac 
ulty member leaving the building, followed by a second faculty member
taking his oﬃce, a third faculty member taking the oﬃce of the second,
and a fourth faculty member taking the oﬃce of the third; (iii) A move
of one faculty to a vacant oﬃce. Both swaps (i) and (ii) involved re 
search money transfers, while of course (iii) did not. We have detailed
data regarding 73 of these faculty, which are the subject of our study.
2.2. The Assignment Data. We collected three types of data: data
on oﬃce characteristics, population characteristics, and the matching
process, which we now describe in turn.
2.2.1. Oﬃce Characteristics. The building had housed one of the de 
partments for many years prior to the renovation. Therefore, faculty
members from that department had detailed information on the desir 
ability of diﬀerent oﬃces. Moreover, before the oﬃce selections were
12Also, three oﬃces were reserved for potential new hires, who were given a
number in the ranking similarly to the other faculty members. Department repre-
sentatives were in charge of selecting those oﬃces.A FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 9
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Oﬃce and Population
Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Oﬃce Variables:
Large, Corner Oﬃce 0.10 0.30 0 1 73
Western Exposure 0.38 0.49 0 1
Floor 6.40 1.24 4 8
Faculty Variables:
Years since PhD 13.64 11.09 0 37 72
Years since Joining School 9.51 8.78 0 35
Female 0.21 0.41 0 1 73
Coauthors 1.56 1.63 0 6
Lunches† 2.5 2.34 0 9 54
Social Events‡ 0.94 1.22 0 4
Friends 2.86 2.47 0 9
Coauthors and not Friends 0.81 1.01 0 3
Coauthors and Friends 0.97 1.32 0 4
Department Links 18.6 5.21 12 25 73
Research Cluster Links 5.32 2.31 0 8
Institutional Variables:
Departments 18.25 5.73 13 26 4
Research Clusters 4.87 2.90 1 9 15
Note: (†) Refers to colleagues with whom survey respondents report having regular
lunches in Question 6 of the survey; (‡) Refers to colleagues with whom survey
respondents report meeting socially outside school in Question 8 of the survey.
made, the dean’s oﬃce provided detailed descriptions regarding oﬃce
attributes to all faculty.
The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the avail 
able oﬃces, which vary in ﬂoor, view, and size. The oﬃces are located
on the top ﬁve ﬂoors of an eight ﬂoor building. Half of ﬂoor 4 and
ﬂoors 5, 6, 7, and 8 had undergone renovation.13 Each ﬂoor has oﬃces
that face east, west, and south.
In terms of size, there are three oﬃce types. The majority of of 
ﬁces are identically sized (at about 213 square feet). These are the 56
oﬃces facing either west or east, aligned on the two sides of a main
corridor, on ﬂoors 5, 6, 7, and 8 (accounting for 76% of all oﬃces).
Then there are 8 large oﬃces in the corners of the south sides of ﬂoors
13The lower ﬂoors and the other half of the 4th ﬂoor contain classrooms (and
were not modiﬁed).10 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
4 through 8 (corresponding to 10% of all oﬃces). These have an area
of approximately 261 square feet and include an additional 20 square
feet of closets Finally, there are 10 smaller oﬃces in the south sides of
ﬂoors 4 through 8 that have an area of approximately 200 square feet.
Since the oﬃces are very similar in terms of size, the view was con 
sidered an important distinguishing characteristic. Faculty were told
that the preferred views tend to be on the higher ﬂoors, and on the
sides facing west and south (in high ﬂoors, the west  and south exposed
oﬃces have open city views, while the east ones look onto a high traﬃc
artery).14 See Figure 2 for a graphical illustration of the oﬃces’ spatial
arrangement. In what follows, we will consider two oﬃces to be in the
same neighborhood if the distance between the oﬃce doors is less than
30 feet.15
2.2.2. Population Characteristics. The bottom two panels of Table 1
contain the summary statistics of our population, and Section 3 pro 
vides a detailed description of its characteristics. Faculty members’
attributes were collected using two sources:
(1) Web harvested individual data on department, research clus 
ter, arrival at the school, Ph.D. cohort, coauthorship, education
background, and gender.
(2) Survey results. Faculty members were surveyed after the draft
and the ex post trades took place. There were 36 completed
survey respondents (50% of the total number of faculty mem 
bers). The survey elicited information on the faculty’s social
network as well as their preferences over the oﬃces’ physical
(ﬂoor, view, and size) and non physical (colleagues’ proximity)
attributes. The respondents were also asked to assess the im 
portance of each oﬃce attribute keeping the other attributes
constant. The complete list of questions asked in the survey
and the aggregate responses are available in Appendix A.
2.2.3. The Matching Process Data. Our data contain the complete re 
sults from the matching process. In particular, besides the ﬁnal assign 
ment of oﬃces after swaps, for every choice made we know the set of
faculty who had already chosen an oﬃce, how the partial assignment
14Faculty members were encouraged to tour the building with its current tenants
and examine the oﬃces.
15The 30 feet ﬁgure is chosen to include oﬃces that are less than two doors away
on either side of the main corridor. Since there are no oﬃces directly in front of
them, oﬃces facing south have neighbors only on their own side of the corridor.A FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 11
looked at the time of choice, and the remaining faculty who still had
to make a choice.
3. The Underlying Networks
Individuals interact in diﬀerent spheres. Since the location of an
oﬃce may aﬀect one’s quality of work life on both purely social and
purely intellectual levels, we elicited peer connections on three dimen 
sions: institutional links, determined according to the department or
research cluster each faculty belongs to, coauthorship links, and friend 
ship links. Below, we describe each of these layers of the network of
connections and the correlations between them.
3.1. Institutional Network. The ﬁrst network we consider addresses
the research interests of faculty members, dividing them according to
their speciﬁc research ﬁelds. The 73 faculty members are divided into
4 departments according to main research ﬁelds. Each department is
further divided into research clusters according to sub ﬁelds, resulting
in a total of 15 clusters. The average department size is 18.25 indi 
viduals (ranging from 13 to 26 members). The average cluster size is
approximately 5 individuals (ranging from 1 to 9 members).16 The re 
search network appears in Figure 1. In the ﬁgure, each node’s shape
corresponds to a particular research department, where each of the four
departments is located in a diﬀerent quadrant. Nodes are encircled in
a shaded circle if they belong to the same research cluster. In both the
Department and Research Cluster networks all individuals are all con 
nected to one another, so each component in these networks is complete
(in particular, the average distance17 within a connected component is
1).18
3.2. Coauthorship Network. The second network encapsulates pro 
fessional interactions among faculty, as captured by the existence of
coauthored work. This network has been constructed by combining
web harvested and survey data. In particular, this network layer con 
siders two faculty connected if they coauthored at least one paper to 
gether in the past or are currently collaborating on a project (the latter
16In our analysis, cluster aﬃliation did not play an important role and our results
are therefore presented using department aﬃliation for the institutional network.
We provide details of the school’s research clusters for the sake of completeness.
17The distance between two nodes is deﬁned as the number of links on the
shortest path in the network connecting the two nodes.
18Moreover, we distinguish the faculty seniority levels in Figure 1 using the
shading of nodes (white for senior faculty and gray for junior faculty).1
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Figure 1. Network Diagram
Department III
Department I Department II
Department IV
Coauthor and Friend Friend Coauthor
Note: Diﬀering shapes represent department aﬃliations; Circles research clusters; Node shading represents seniority level, with white
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element declared in survey responses). The coauthorship network is de 
scribed by the solid lines between nodes (both bold and faint) in Figure
1.
At the time of choice, the average number of coauthors each faculty
member had among other faculty members was 1.6, ranging from 0 to
6. The average distance between connected individuals in this network
is 3.28, ranging from 1 to 10.
3.3. Friendship Network. The friendship network captures the in 
teractions among the 36 faculty members who completed the survey, as
well as the individuals socially connected to them (that is, individuals
who were not survey respondents themselves, but were declared as a
friend by at least one survey respondent).
In detail, Question 6 in the survey asked participants to name up to
5 fellow faculty members with whom they had lunch on a regular basis.
Question 8 asked participants to name up to 5 personal friends (peo 
ple with whom the participant interacts socially with outside school at
least once a month) from within the school (see Appendix A). To build
a friendship network, we combined the answers to these two questions.
Two faculty are connected if they were mentioned one by the other
in responses to either Question 6 or 8. In particular, not all faculty
included in this network are necessarily survey respondents—they are
either survey respondents or individuals connected to a survey respon 
dent. There were 21 faculty who speciﬁed at least one individual on
either one of these questions, leading to 54 extended survey participants
who compose the social network. We stress that survey respondents
who did not specify colleagues’ names answering Questions 6 and 8
could either (i) not have any social interactions with other members of
the faculty, or (ii) have social interactions they prefer not to disclose
in the survey.
This generates the network given by the dotted and bold line con 
nections in Figure 1.19 We assume links are bi directional. Indeed,
Questions 6 and 8 were phrased so that individuals were speciﬁcally
asked to report the frequency of interactions (lunches or social events
outside the school), that are inherently symmetric.20
19Dotted lines correspond to the pure friendship network–links are between
agents who are friends but not coauthors; Bold lines represent the intersection
between the coauthorship and friendship networks–links are between individuals
who are both friends and coauthors.
20In our data, if we restrict attention to survey respondents alone, the probability
that f considers f′ a friend, conditional on f′ considering f a friend, is 52%.14 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
Table 2. Network Correlations
Department Cluster Coauthor Friend
Department 1 0.478 0.240 0.235
Cluster 0.413 1 0.318 0.231
Coauthor 0.254 0.343 1 0.374
Friend 0.387 0.302 0.452 1
Note: Correlations for dummy variable indicating a link between all faculty pairs
(f,f′). Numbers above the diagonal correspond to the full sample, N = 2628,
numbers below the diagonal correspond to the survey sample, N = 630.
As reported in Table 1, the survey respondents are reported to have
an average of 0.9 individuals (ranging from 0 to 4) whom they interact
with socially outside the school, and 2.5 colleagues with whom they
regularly have lunch (ranging from 0 to 9). The average degree in the
friendship network is 2.9, ranging from 0 to 9, and the average distance
between individuals is 4.91, ranging from 1 to 12. Moreover, simple
regression analysis reveals that the faculty that ﬁlled the survey do not
exhibit signiﬁcantly diﬀerent observable attributes from those who did
not.21
3.4. Overlap of Networks. Figure 1 demonstrates the complexity of
the social network under examination, and the diﬀerence between the
coauthor and friendship relations. Table 2 provides the exact corre 
lations between the diﬀerent layers of the social network. The corre 
lations above the main diagonal are computed with observations as 
sociated with all faculty members. The correlations below the main
diagonal are computed restricting the data to survey respondents only.
As clusters are subsets of departments, the two networks are highly
correlated. While friendship ties seem fairly uncorrelated with depart 
ment and cluster links, they are correlated with coauthorship ties. We
account for this correlation throughout our analysis.22
3.5. Existence of Network Eﬀects in Oﬃce Selection. The choice
made by each faculty member during the matching process could be
inﬂuenced both by the oﬃce’s physical attributes (ﬂoor, exposure, size),
21This is the result of a set of regressions including variables such as gender, de-
partment aﬃliation, order of choice in the implemented serial-dictatorship mecha-
nism, years since PhD, years since joining the school, and degree in the coauthorship
network.
22We note that the preferences over physical oﬃce characteristics stated in the
survey are not signiﬁcantly correlated within any of the networks (e.g., department
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as well as the choices made (or expected to be made) by others. Figure
2 describes the outcome of the matching process (after ex post trades
took place), with dotted lines representing the friendship links within
a ﬂoor, faint solid lines the coauthorship links, and bold solid lines the
intersection of both network links. In particular, the ﬁgure represents
the ﬁnal spatial assignment by ﬂoor, with nodes schematically placed
at the doorway of the chosen oﬃces.
We start our investigation by assessing the null hypothesis that net-
work externalities are not taken into consideration during oﬃce selec-
tion. As a ﬁrst take, we consider the discrete choice each faculty is
facing. Each observation in our sample corresponds to a pair (f,o),
where f is a faculty member and o is an oﬃce available to this faculty
member at her time of choice. We specify an array of models in which
choices are explained by variables corresponding to both physical and
network characteristics. Such an approach is inherently non strategic
in that we do not take into account forward looking strategic aspects
that are potentially present if network eﬀects are at play (in particular,
the approach does not allow us to quantify the eﬀects of externalities).
However, note that if the null hypothesis that network externalities are
irrelevant to choice holds, any coeﬃcient pertaining to network vari 
ables should not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Table 3 contains the results of four conditional logit regression speci 
ﬁcations.
23 The variables associated with oﬃces’ physical attributes are
Large Corner Oﬃce, Western Exposure, and Highest Available (which
are the corresponding dummy variables for the respective character 
istics). The rest of the variables are associated with the department,
coauthorship, and friendship networks. Speciﬁcally, consider an obser 
vation pertaining to a particular faculty oﬃce pair (f,o). Department
Neighbor is a count of the number of oﬃces neighboring o that are al 
ready taken by another member of f’s department before his/her turn
in the sequence;24 Department Floor indicates the number of individ 
uals in f’s department that were present on the ﬂoor corresponding
to o at the time of choice. Similarly, Coauthor Neighbor is an integer
variable representing the number of neighboring oﬃces close to o that
have been taken by faculty members with coauthor ties to f at the time
23Note that the set of available oﬃces decreases by one unit after each choice is
made. Thus, a faculty at position k = 1,..,N in the ranking has N −k+1 possible
oﬃces to choose from. Each observation in our data corresponds to a faculty and
their menu of oﬃces (excluding the last faculty who was left with no choice). Thus,
for our 73 faculty, we have a total of 73×74
2 − 1 = 2700 possible choices.
24Recall that in Section 2.2.1 we deﬁned two oﬃces as neighbors if the distance
between oﬃce doors is less than 30 feet.16 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
Figure 2. The Observed Assignment
Floor 8
Floor 7
Floor 6
Floor 5
Floor 4
Coauthor and Friend Friend Coauthor
Note: Diﬀering shapes represent department aﬃliations; Circles research clusters;
Node shading represents seniority level, with white for seniors, and gray for juniors.
of choice. Similarly Coauthor and not-Friend Neighbor, not-Coauthor
and Friend Neighbor, and Coauthor and Friend Neighbor represent the
counts of faculty members that are coauthors but not friends, friends
but not coauthors, and both friends and coauthors, respectively, in
oﬃces neighboring o at the time of choice.A FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 17
Table 3. Conditional Logit Regressions
Variable CL(i) CL(ii) CL(iii) CL(iv)
Large Corner Oﬃce 0.155 0.284∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.078) (0.088) (0.113)
Western Exposure 0.312∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.033) (0.036) (0.048)
Highest Available 0.368∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.071) (0.053) (0.076)
Department Neighbor 0.174∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.038) (0.049)
Department on Floor 0.082∗∗∗
(0.027)
Coauthor Neighbor 0.186∗
(0.103)
Coauthor and not Friend Neighbor  0.040
(0.247)
not Coauthor and Friend Neighbor 0.095
(0.171)
Coauthor and Friend Neighbor 0.319∗∗
(0.156)
N 73 73 73 54
Note: Coeﬃcients represent marginal eﬀects between two otherwise identical of-
ﬁces; Standard deviations given in parentheses. (∗) indicates signiﬁcance with 90%
conﬁdence, (∗∗) with 95% conﬁdence, and (∗∗∗) with 99% conﬁdence.
Throughout all the speciﬁcations of Table 3, the coeﬃcients measure
the marginal increase in the probability of an oﬃce being selected as
a result of a unit increase in the variable under consideration. For ex 
ample, in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, denoted CL(i), we include only the
physical attributes of oﬃces. Given two oﬃces that diﬀer only in their
exposure, the oﬃce with the western exposure is 31.2% more likely to
be selected. In the subsequent speciﬁcations, denoted CL(ii)–CL(iv),
we introduce the variables associated with network externalities.25 Net 
work variables have signiﬁcant explanatory power. For instance, each
additional coauthor located in a neighboring oﬃce raises the probabil 
ity of an oﬃce being selected by 19%.
25Speciﬁcations CL(ii–iv) were chosen to correspond to our ensuing speciﬁca-
tions in Section 5. The last speciﬁcation, CL(iv), is restricted to faculty who have
links in our friendship network and as such pertains to fewer observations.18 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
The results of these speciﬁcations provide two main insights. First,
network variables’ coeﬃcients are positive and, at the micro neighborhood
level, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at any reasonable conﬁdence
level.26 In particular, we reject the null hypothesis that network ex-
ternalities (at all three levels) did not inﬂuence faculty’s oﬃce choices.
Second, the regressions suggest the importance of accounting for net 
work eﬀects when estimating such matching processes. Indeed, the
coeﬃcients corresponding to oﬃces’ physical attributes change signiﬁ 
cantly when we include network variables. Note that these coeﬃcients
respond in diﬀerent ways to the omission of network variables: the
eﬀects of large corner oﬃces are underestimated in CL(i) relative to
CL(iii) since faculty choose oﬃces close to colleagues even when large
oﬃces are available; the eﬀects of highest ﬂoor are overestimated in
CL(i) relative to CL(iii), suggesting that faculty may be choosing
higher ﬂoors to be in proximity to particular colleagues, rather than
out of a preference for higher ﬂoors per se.27
We stress that given the signiﬁcant network eﬀects, the magnitudes of
the coeﬃcients we estimate need to be interpreted cautiously. Indeed,
when network eﬀects are present, individuals making choices within the
serial dictatorship protocol may consider future choices of others, mak 
ing the conditional logit speciﬁcation problematic. With that caveat,
the results reported in Table 3 are useful in two respects. First, as
we have discussed, they illustrate the existence of network eﬀects in
choices. Second, they provide a methodological baseline for our inves 
tigation since conditional logit analysis is common in studies such as
ours. In what follows, we estimate the extent to which network eﬀects
aﬀected ﬁnal outcomes. When these eﬀects turn out to be important,
we introduce new techniques for estimating preferences accounting for
strategic motives present in the mechanism under consideration.
4. Dartboard Approach: Network Effects and Outcomes
The exploratory regressions discussed in Section 3 suggest the exis 
tence of non trivial eﬀects of network externalities on match outcomes.
In order to assess the magnitude of these eﬀects, we start by consider 
ing counterfactual assignment procedures that do not account for any
26The joint hypothesis that the network variables are all zero in speciﬁcations
CL(ii–iv) is rejected at the 99.9% level.
27In principle, there could be instances in which physical characteristics of an
oﬃce are correlated with network attributes (for instance, corner oﬃces are by geog-
raphy more isolated than others). When controlling for oﬃces’ spatial arrangement
by including oﬃces’ number of neighbors and a corner oﬃce dummy, we ﬁnd no
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Table 4. Conterfactual Sorting in Simulated Oﬃce As 
signments
Variable Proximity Observed Counterfactual
CF(i) CF(ii) CF(iii)
Department
Neighbor 80 63.0∗∗ 61.2∗∗∗ 63.2∗∗
(6.5) (5.2) (6.6)
Floor 164 151.1∗ 147.0∗∗∗ 151.1
(9.4) (0.0) (9.4)
Coauthor
Neighbor 14 5.3∗∗∗ 3.3∗∗∗ 5.7∗∗∗
(2.2) (1.3) (2.3)
Floor 22 12.7∗∗∗ 13.0∗∗∗ 13.8∗∗
(3.1) (0.0) (3.4)
Friend
Neighbor 15 6.2∗∗∗ 6.0∗∗∗ 7.0∗∗∗
(2.4) (1.7) (2.5)
Floor 24 14.9∗∗ 14.0∗∗∗ 16.7∗∗
(3.4) (0.0) (3.5)
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. (∗) indicates signiﬁcance with
90% conﬁdence, (∗∗) with 95% conﬁdence, and (∗∗∗) with 99% conﬁdence. Simula-
tion speciﬁcations: CF(i) Random preferences; CF(ii) Lexicographic preferences
(Size≻View≻Floor); CF(iii) is based on results of CL(i) in Table 3. The number
of simulations is 105.
observable externalities and compare the degree to which such proce 
dures generate network proximity relative to that observed in our data.
Put diﬀerently, we assess to what extent a random assignment based
on purely physical oﬃce attributes can explain the observed patterns of
social connection, accounting for the mechanism in place (namely, the
order in which faculty chose oﬃces). We consider three benchmarks
that diﬀer in the prevailing faculty preferences for oﬃces.
In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, denoted CF(i), we consider all oﬃces equiv 
alent, so that at each stage, faculty choose one of the available of 
ﬁces at random. In speciﬁcation CF(ii), we assume that each faculty
has a lexicographic preference in which large corner oﬃces are valued
most, followed by western exposure oﬃces, followed by higher oﬃces.28
Again, within each class of oﬃces, faculty randomly select an oﬃce.
28The preference for higher oﬃces over lower ones is consistent with survey re-
sults. Indeed, in Question 11 in the survey, 86% of respondents declared the top
ﬂoors, ﬂoors 6 − 8, as their most preferred, and 83% declared the bottom ﬂoors,
ﬂoors 4 − 5, as their least preferred. The assumption that faculty prefer larger20 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
In the third speciﬁcation, denoted CF(iii), we suppose faculty have
preferences as in our discrete choice model CL(i) in Table 3, where the
probability of choosing any oﬃce is determined by the set of available
oﬃces, and the physical characteristics of those oﬃces.29
For each of the speciﬁcations, we used the order in which faculty
chose to simulate the random matching procedure 105 times. For ev 
ery set of simulations, we considered the three network layers: insti 
tutional aﬃliation (captured through department), coauthorship, and
friendship (encapsulating the connections determined through social
interaction or lunch companionship as described in Section 2). We cal 
culated the resulting average volume of faculty from each network in
a participating faculty’s macro neighborhood (the ﬂoor of their oﬃce),
and their micro neighborhood (the set of close oﬃce neighbors), which
are reported in the counterfactual columns in Table 4. For each sim 
ulation we run a one sided test of whether the observed outcome is in
the right tail of the simulated distribution.
Table 4 illustrates how the simulated faculty placements exhibit net 
work links that are consistently lower than those observed in the data,
for each of the three layers. For example, the number of faculty mem 
bers who share a department aﬃliation and locate on the same ﬂoor is
164 in our data, but at most 151 in each of the counterfactuals, an 8%
diﬀerence. Floor level proximity is also signiﬁcantly lower by at least
36% for coauthors and 30% for friends.
At the micro neighborhood level, our results are most striking, with
proximity of oﬃce neighbors under the coauthorship and friendship
layers lower than the observed number by at least 59% and 53% respec 
tively (signiﬁcant at any conventional conﬁdence level). Department 
level sorting was signiﬁcantly lower as well, by approximately 21%.
In our survey, looking at responses to questions asking about the im-
portance of oﬃce ﬂoor, exposure, and size (on a 1–10 scale), we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in responses, though the distribution of responses
of oﬃce ﬂoor did stochastically dominate those corresponding to size
and exposure. As a robustness check, we implemented an additional set
of simulations. We used individual responses of survey participants to
run an auxiliary conditional logit speciﬁcation that includes expressed
oﬃces to smaller ones and oﬃces with city views to large road views seem natural
ﬁrst steps.
29That is, the simulated choice probability for oﬃce i within choice set C is given
by e
xiβ
P
j∈C e
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preferences (eﬀectively interacted with survey participation) as addi 
tional variables. We then simulated the dartboard assignment as in
CF(iii), and obtained virtually identical results.
The conclusion from this array of counterfactual simulations is that
the order in which faculty chose their oﬃces does not seem, in itself, to
explain the spatial concentration of those connected in these networks.
Furthermore, in terms of outcomes, the diﬀerences between procedures
that disregard network attributes and those observed in the data is
substantial.
In comparison with the discrete choice models assessed in Table 3,
the results in this section illustrate the potential importance of network
externalities in determining outcomes. However, they do not allow us
to back out the preferences of participants. Most importantly, the
dartboard technique does not allow us to disentangle the diﬀerential
eﬀects from each of the diﬀerent networks on agents’ choices. This is so
for two reasons: First, since the diﬀerent layers of social networks are
correlated, cross layer comparisons of the dartboard approach results
cannot be directly associated to agents’ utility. Second, because of the
strategic nature of the matching process, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in how
agents perceive the diﬀerent layers of the social networks may result
in small diﬀerences in the counterfactual estimates based on outcomes,
and vice versa.
5. Estimating the Relative Effects of Different
Networks
The previous two sections motivated the importance of networks to
the oﬃce selection mechanism. In particular, they make the case that
externalities matter. In this section, we seek to disentangle the relative
importance of each of the three layers on oﬃce choice: the department
aﬃliation, the coauthorship network, and the friendship network. In
particular, we are interested in separating the eﬀects of the institutional
network generated by membership in a department from those of the
spontaneous networks based on coauthorship and friendship.
In principle, the mechanism used for allocating oﬃces deﬁnes an
extensive form game. Assume that agents’ preferences take some func 
tional form allowing for the weight placed on each network and each
physical oﬃce characteristic to be parametrized. Then, for any pa 
rameter value, there would be a corresponding set of equilibria of the
assignment mechanism. In principle, this approach would allow us to
select the parameters that best match our data. Note, however, that
strategies in this game are contingent plans that specify, for each agent,22 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
an oﬃce selection that depends on the entire history of choices made
by all predecessors. Since our data set contains 72 faculty who have a
non trivial choice, the set of strategies is vast and ﬁnding parametric
equilibria proﬁles is not computationally feasible.30
In order to overcome this computational diﬃculty and still exploit
the strategic elements inherent in the matching process, we focus on
natural restrictions on the ﬁnal assignment, using the fact that faculty
members were allowed to swap oﬃces after the draft was completed,
and that monetary transfers across research accounts were allowed to
facilitate such swaps. In what follows, we assume that the transfers
were not subject to budget constraints. Indeed, all faculty were allotted
identical budget allocations and were allowed to borrow against future
years’ provisions. Therefore, once the assignment has been determined
(after all ex post oﬃce swaps had been carried out), we can assume
that there are no remaining beneﬁcial swaps, that is, the assignment is
stable. In the spirit of Bajari and Fox (2010), and Fox (2010), we require
that no two faculty would beneﬁt from exchanging oﬃces (accounting
for network eﬀects derived from such an exchange) regardless of the
monetary transfers between them. This requirement provides us with
a manageable set of restrictions that allows for preference estimation.
5.1. Stability with Externalities. Consider a ﬁnite set of faculty
F = {1,...,N} and a ﬁnite set of oﬃces O = {1,...,N}. We ulti 
mately observe an assignment µ : F → O, a bijection assigning each
faculty member to a particular oﬃce. The utility of faculty member
f can be generically represented by the utility function uf(µ).31 For
any assignment µ, we denote by µ
f′
f the assignment derived from µ by
exchanging the oﬃce assignments of f and f′:
µ
f′
f (x) :=

 
 
µ(f′) if x = f
µ(f) if x = f′
µ(x) otherwise
30The computation of the set of Nash equilibria requires a factorial time algo-
rithm. In fact, for N faculty members, the number of edges of the extensive-form
game is
N + N(N − 1) + ... +
N!
2!
+
N!
1!
= N!
N−1  
j=1
1
j!
≈ N!(e − 1) − 1
31Unlike matching settings without externalities, in which an agent’s utility de-
pends solely on their own match, externalities imply that utilities may depend on
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The notion of stability (with transfers) we use requires that for any
faculty pair (f,f′) there does not exist a transfer t from f to f′ such
that the bilateral exchange of oﬃces speciﬁed by µ improves both
their outcomes. That is, there does not exist a transfer t such that
uf(µ
f′
f )−t ≥ uf(µ) and uf′(µ
f′
f )+t ≥ uf′(µ), with at least one of these
inequalities being strict. Or, equivalently:
Deﬁnition 1 (Pairwise Stability). An assignment µ is pairwise stable
if for every pair (f,f′) ∈ F × F
uf(µ) + uf′(µ) ≥ uf(µ
f′
f ) + uf′(µ
f′
f ).
We remain agnostic as to the exact nature of any bargaining or
distribution of any pairwise surplus from a switch, but maintain the
condition that should a pairwise reassignment be improving, that it
be carried out. It is useful to contrast the notion of stability we use,
exchange of an assigned object between two faculty f and f′, and
the blocking pair notion of stability in two sided matching, where a
faculty oﬃce pair (f,o) would block an assignment. Due to a lack of
agency or preferences on the side of the oﬃces, the blocking coalition
is of the same size, two agents, but on just one side of the market. A
similar comparison could be made with the stability notion used in the
networks literature (see, e.g., Jackson, 2004).
We note two important observations regarding the assumptions un 
derlying this deﬁnition. First, for technical tractability, our stability
notion essentially assumes that faculty have myopic (or boundedly ra 
tional) beliefs over the process that ensues following a deviation. In 
deed, in the presence of externalities, a switch by any pair of faculty
aﬀects others uninvolved in the swap. In general, one could contem 
plate beliefs specifying the reactions of all participants to such a devi 
ation (in which case even existence can be problematic to obtain, see
Sasaki and Toda, 1996 and Hafalir, 2008). Second, our notion considers
only bilateral swaps, rather than exchanges among larger groups. We
choose to focus on pairwise stability for simplicity and to match the
behaviorally founded idea that it would be harder for larger coalitions
to optimize collectively.32
Pairwise stability generates
(N−1)×N
2 necessary inequalities. In our
data, one faculty moved to a diﬀerent building after the initial assign 
ment. Therefore, with 72 faculty left in the building after the ex post
swaps, we generate 2,556 inequalities. We will assume that preferences
32A similar analysis can be completed with three-way swaps, which we also carry
out as a robustness check. We return to this point at the end of this section.24 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
take the following form:
(1) uf(µ) := Pµ(f) + βR(f;µ),
where Po represents the physical desirability of oﬃce o (its view, ex 
posure, and size) and R(f;µ) is a vector of network eﬀects speciﬁc to
f induced by the assignment µ (proximity to coauthors, friends, de 
partmental colleagues, etc.). In fact, throughout our analysis, we will
assume that R(f;µ) depends (linearly) on the number of faculty from
each network under consideration that end up on their ﬂoor or in their
immediate neighborhood. That is, for any faculty f, let k(f,µ,l) be the
number of faculty from network layer l, l = 1,...,L (research, coauthor 
ship, friendship, and so on) that are in f’s neighborhood (say, ﬂoor)
under the assignment µ. Then,
uf(µ) := Pµ(f) +
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ,l).
This formulation allows for the volume of peers in close proximity to an
assigned oﬃce to aﬀect the occupants’ well being. For simplicity, we
assume that the volume of faculty members not directly connected to
the individual has no eﬀect on well being. This formulation is general
in that: (i) Networks could be thought of as bilateral, with each pair
of agents constituting a particular layer l, so it is additive separability,
not linearity, that places the main constraint on utilities’ functional
form. (ii) The coeﬃcients {βl} are not restricted in sign so that peer
eﬀects can be either positive of negative.33
Proposition 1, whose proof is given in Appendix B, shows that the
market structure we impose allows for the existence of pairwise stable
assignments.
34
Proposition 1 (Existence). There exists a pairwise-stable assignment.
We now add a stochastic term to represent an idiosyncratic compo 
nent for faculty f’s preferences for a match µ so that preferences are
33However, a layer must be symmetric: should faculty member f value the prox-
imity of f′ at x utiles, it must be the case that f′ values the proximity of f at x too.
This symmetry rules out cycles, where one faculty member desires close proximity
to another who desires distance, and is key to the existence result in Proposition 1.
34We note that existence of stable assignments in the presence of externalities
has been a major hurdle in the theoretical literature on the topic. Our existence
result suggests that in environments such as those we study, stability is a managable
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represented by:
U(f,µ) := Pµ(f) +
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ,l) + ε
f
µ(f),
where ε is the match speciﬁc unobserved idiosyncratic error.35 Given
this speciﬁcation, consider the pairwise stability condition correspond 
ing to the two faculty members. The physical attractiveness of the
oﬃce essentially serves as a ﬁxed eﬀect when contemplating a swap,
which can be directly compensated for with a transfer. Consequently,
pairwise stability constraints put restrictions on the network compo 
nents of faculty’s utility. Formally, pairwise stability of a match µ
translates into the following: For any two faculty f,f′, noting that
µ(f) = µ
f′
f (f′) and µ(f′) = µ
f′
f (f),
(2)
β (Rf(µ) + Rf′(µ))+ε
f
µ(f)+ε
f′
µ(f′) ≥ β 
 
Rf(µ
f′
f ) + Rf′(µ
f′
f )
 
+ε
f
µ(f′)+ε
f′
µ(f).
The inequalities captured in (2) allow us to estimate the underlying
parameter vector β.
5.2. Implementation. The set of inequalities deﬁned by (2) serve as
the basis for maximizing a score function (see Manski, 1975) deﬁned
as:
(3) Q(β) :=
 
f =f′
1
 
β  
 
Rf(µ) + Rf′(µ) − Rf(µ
f′
f ) − Rf′(µ
f′
f )
 
> 0
 
Three remarks about this objective function are in order. First, note
that each term in (3) is deﬁned in terms of a strong inequality. While
inconsequential for the estimated parameters themselves, this allows us
to get slightly more meaningful optimal score values. For example, in
many cases our network measures are sparse–that is, two faculty are not
likely to be connected across a particular measure. When individuals
are not connected, the corresponding summand in (3) would always be
satisﬁed if the inequality were weak. In particular, the values of the
score would be shifted up by the number of faculty pairs who are not
connected in any of the network layers relevant for the speciﬁcation.36
35Strictly speaking, our existence result does not pertain to these modiﬁed utility
functions. However, if one assumes that after the error terms are realized, they
become common knowledge among the participants, existence follows in much the
same way as in our original result.
36We stress that, since our scores are lower than the ones obtained with a weak
inequality version of (3), there is a diﬀerence in magnitude between these scores and26 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
In our results we report the score with strong inequalities as above, but
also with a modiﬁed indicator function that assigns value 1
2 to pairs
satisfying the condition with equality, and value 1 to those associated
with a strong inequality.
Second, instead of maximizing the score Q(β), one can consider a
smoothed version of the score, a là Horowitz (1992), which would be
continuous and amenable to diﬀerential methods of optimization and
would produce a point estimate. However, the point identiﬁcation as 
sumptions required for smoothed scores are similar to those required in
the Manski score setup, and rely on data covariates being continuously
distributed. Therefore, although the procedure would produce a point
estimate, results would depend heavily on the smoothing function used
and would not be asymptotically consistent for an arbitrary smoothing
function.
The advantages of the objective given in (3) are threefold: First,
the objective is computationally simple. Second, although we do not
meet the conditions required for asymptotic point identiﬁcation, the
boundaries of the estimated intervals are identiﬁed. Third, the score
speciﬁcation is robust to heteroskedasticity of the match speciﬁc errors,
which seems important in this setting 37
Finally, the value of the score is invariant to scaling of the parameter
β (for any a > 0, Q(aβ) = Q(β))–the scale is never identiﬁed, and es 
timation requires a normalization for one of the coeﬃcients that must
have a non zero contribution to preferences. As previously demon 
strated through our discrete choice estimations (see Table 3) and il 
lustrated in Figure 2, locating near department colleagues plays an
important role in location choice. In addition, since the average de 
gree corresponding to the department network is high (relative to the
other network layers we consider), many of the inequalities in (3) have
non trivial elements pertaining to departmental network eﬀects. We
therefore normalize the coeﬃcient for the proximity of a departmen 
tal neighbor to 1, denominating the remaining variables in terms of
foregone departmental neighbors. In order to further justify this nor 
malization, Table 5 provides the score Q when accounting for only one
layer of the network. Since the magnitudes of the relevant coeﬃcient β
cannot be calibrated, we look at the scores for β = 1 and β = −1. Ta 
ble 5 reports the score Q for both the entire data set and the subset of
the ones found in the literature that employs maximum scores with weak inequalities
(see, for instance, Bajari and Fox, 2010).
37Estimations were performed using Mathematica’s diﬀerential evolution algo-
rithm, which has good properties when used to ﬁnd global extrema of optimization
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Table 5. Single Variable Explanatory Power
Normalization β = 1 β = −1
Full Ext. Survey Full Ext. Survey
Department Neighbor 51.8% 53.7% 13.2% 11.0%
Department Floor 41.6% 42.3% 16.4% 14.8%
Coauthor Neighbor 42.2% 51.0% 7.6% 6.5%
Coauthor Floor 40.0% 43.3% 11.3% 10.9%
Friend Neighbor   58.7%   9.9%
Friend Floor   50.6%   10.8%
Number of Inequalities 2556 1431 2556 1431
Note: The column headed β = 1 (β = −1) corresponds to a positive (negative)
normalization for variables. The scores correspond to the percentage of inequalities
predicted with objective (3).
observations corresponding to participants of the extended survey. The
Department Neighbor variable is the one generating the highest score
levels over the full sample, and the second highest over the extended 
survey sample.38
5.3. Results. Holding constant the Department Neighbor normaliza 
tion discussed above, we now estimate the intensities of each network
layer relative to this variable. Our results are given in Table 6. We
report estimates derived from the maximization of (3). The coeﬃcients
are reported as an identiﬁed interval
 
β
i,β
i 
for the speciﬁc variable
i, where β
i is the minimal coeﬃcient that maximizes the objective (3),
38Note that, as stressed above, we would have obtained higher scores using a weak
inequality version of (3). In particular, the only inequalities that we would not have
been able to predict are the ones explained by a negative coeﬃcient (β = −1) when
inequalities are strict. For instance, Department Neighbor would have predicted
2219 inequalities with a positive normalization. We also mention that considering
interaction terms maintains the Department Neighbor variable as dominant in terms
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and β
i
is the maximal one.39 That is:
β
i = argmin
 
˜ β
i
| ˜ β ∈ argmax
β∈RL Q(β)
 
and
β
i
= argmax
 
˜ β
i
| ˜ β ∈ argmax
β∈RL Q(β)
 
.
This approach is required by the lack of point identiﬁcation for β,
which we discuss below. Roughly speaking, the objective deﬁnes a set
of linear inequalities that generically would have multiple maximizing
solutions. The inherent multiplicity of solutions is caused by two fac 
tors: (i) a discontinuous objective; and (ii) integer measures for our
network layers.40
The ﬁrst column in Table 6, titled PS(i), gauges the relative impor 
tance of the micro  and macro neighborhoods for department members.
Department Floor is a count of the number of department colleagues
currently located on the same ﬂoor for the particular faculty oﬃce pair
under consideration. The speciﬁcation produces no signiﬁcant eﬀect for
ﬂoor organization. However, even though the ﬂoor coeﬃcient is small
in size, the negative sign still explains approximately 500 inequalities
over the single variable Department Neighbor. The negative sign could
be interpreted as a decreasing returns eﬀect to Department Neighbor
with which it is (unsurprisingly) correlated. Given the small estimated
size of the coeﬃcient, and the insigniﬁcance of the eﬀect, we conclude
that local neighborhood proximity is much more important than ﬂoor
proximity.
In PS(ii), we evaluate the importance of the coauthorship network
relative to the department network. The ﬁrst point to note from
PS(ii) is the large and signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect coming from Coau-
thor Neighbor. In particular, looking at the assessed interval we ﬁnd
that having a single coauthor nearby is enough, ceteris paribus, to
compensate for four to ﬁve department colleagues in neighboring of 
ﬁces. The constructed inference region for this coeﬃcient is large, and
should be interpreted as inferring that with 95% conﬁdence, the coeﬃ 
cient exceeds 2.15. The presence of ∞ in the estimates implies a lack of
identiﬁcation for the upper bound. When appearing in the conﬁdence
39Similarly, conﬁdence intervals reported in Table 6 are constructed using the
minimal coeﬃcients for the lower limits and the maximal coeﬃcients for the upper
limit, a particularly conservative approach to ﬁnding the 95% conﬁdence interval.
40Note that when the speciﬁcation entails more than one coeﬃcient in addition
to the normalized one, β and β need not maximize the objective. In particular,
focusing on a set of coeﬃcients with minimal absolute values provides a conservative
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Table 6. Pairwise Stability Estimates
Variable PS(i) PS(ii) PS(iii)
Department Neighbor 1 1 1
Department Floor ( 0.07, 0.08)
[-0.33,0.39]
Coauthor Neighbor (4.00,5.00)
[2.15,∞)
Coauthor and not Friend Neighbor (3.00,4.47)
[0.35,7.64]
not Coauthor and Friend Neighbor (0.00,0.50)
[-0.84,1.90]
Coauthor and Friend Neighbor (6.07,9.41)
[2.95,∞)
ScoreN 84.1%
69.3%
84.9%
75.2%
87.1%
82.2%
Number of Inequalities 2,556 2,556 1,431
Note: 95% conﬁdence score derived from 2,000 subsamples comprised of inequal-
ities for 250 randomly selected faculty pairs. The conﬁdence regions below the
estimates represent the projection of the 95% conﬁdence set projected onto the real
line. Department Neighbor is normalized to 1 for scale identiﬁcation. (N) The top
percentage denotes the fraction of all inequalities satisﬁed and the bottom percent-
age is the fraction of inequalities satisﬁed with weak inequalities receiving a weight
of 1/2.
interval, it implies that in 5% or more of subsamples there is a lack of
identiﬁcation.
Finally, we introduce data from the friendship network in PS(iii).
In this speciﬁcation we only include those inequalities corresponding
to swaps between the 54 members of the extended survey network.41
Consequently, the sample size decreases by approximately 45%. In
this speciﬁcation, to avoid multicollinearity problems, we decompose
the coauthorship and friendship networks and obtain the orthogonal
variables Coauthor and not-Friend Neighbor, not-Coauthor and Friend
Neighbor, and Coauthor and Friend Neighbor.
41However, the vector of characteristics for each of the remaining faculty are
calculated using data on the entire population. For example, a faculty member out-
side of the extended-survey sample will still be counted as a coauthor/department
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In our previous empirical approaches, in Sections 3 and 4, the friend 
ship and coauthorship networks appear to have a comparable impact
on the ﬁnal outcome. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcients in Table 3 repre 
sent similar eﬀects from each network on the probability of choosing
a particular oﬃce, and Table 4 points to a similar level of additional
sorting in each network. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the friendship net 
work does not have a strong eﬀect on oﬃce choice with respect to the
other network layers. This result is due to an important diﬀerence be 
tween this approach and the previous techniques: indeed, the stability
estimation incorporates the information derived from the lack of ex 
post swaps that could have produced greater proximity among friends.
However, the coeﬃcients associated with Coauthor and Friend Neigh-
bor in PS(iii) illustrate that friendship and coauthorship are important
together, exceeding a coeﬃcient of 2.95 with 95% conﬁdence.42
The reported conﬁdence intervals corresponding to the maximal score
estimators utilize an i.i.d. subsampling methodology (for additional
details on subsampling see Romano and Wolf, 1999; as it applies to
maximum score estimators, see Delgado, Rodriguez Poo, and Wolf,
2001) to estimate the 95% conﬁdence interval of the maximum score
estimator.43,44
Regarding the econometric techniques we employ and the estimated
errors, Manski and Thompson (1986) present simulation evidence sug 
gesting that the bootstrap method allows a good approximation for the
estimator’s root mean squared error. There is little additional evidence
on the performance of the bootstrap method in this speciﬁc application
before Delgado, Rodriguez Poo, and Wolf (2001), who provide a the 
oretical justiﬁcation for subsampling and present simulation evidence
suggesting inconsistency of the bootstrap method.
42Speciﬁcations including ﬂoor-level variables for both coauthors and friendships
found results similar to PS(iii). While the inclusion increases the score slightly,
the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients remain similar. This leads us to
believe that ﬂoor-level variables do not have powerful explanatory value. Similarly,
the inclusion of variables related to research clusters do not add explanatory power
to the speciﬁcations PS(ii) − PS(iii).
43For additional econometric results on partial identiﬁcation see Imbens and
Manski (2004), Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), Stoye (2009), and Romano
and Shaikh (2010), as well as references therein.
44We also estimated the conﬁdence regions using the Romano and Shaikh (2010)
methodology. Results are qualitatively similar. Nonetheless, the subsampling re-
sults that we report provide tighter conﬁdence intervals than those produced using
the Romano and Shaikh technique, which, in our setting, are insensitive to the
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We would like to point to some issues pertaining to the asymptotic
identiﬁcation assumptions required for these estimation methods. The
assumptions in Bajari and Fox (2010) require that, given enough data,
for any parameter vector diﬀerent from the true one, more inequal 
ities would be violated. In a setting in which all of the underlying
explanatory variables are related to social network degrees, one may
expect problems since: (i) network degrees (and, in fact, many other
network characteristics) are discrete by nature; and (ii) it is unlikely
that individuals have unboundedly many social connections, even as
we consider arbitrarily large samples. Point identiﬁcation is therefore
inherently problematic. In that respect, we ﬁnd the intervals that max 
imize our objective function appealing in that they are pessimistic in
terms of coeﬃcients’ signiﬁcance.
We performed a series of robustness checks on our results. First, one
might be concerned that senior and junior faculty behave diﬀerently in
the assignment process.45 Namely, they could have access to diﬀerent
resources to carry out trades, or they may have diﬀering preferences
over oﬃce attributes. To address the ﬁrst concern, we run a set of esti 
mations in which faculty are allowed to trade only within their tenure
status (i.e., seniors with seniors, and juniors with juniors). As for the
second concern, we also run estimations separately for senior and ju 
nior faculty. Both sets of estimations yield results similar to the ones
we report.
46 Furthermore, we considered an alternative stability notion
allowing three way swaps, which yields virtually identical estimates to
those reported. Finally, we obtained auxiliary data regarding the lo 
cation of faculty prior to the move and generated a fourth network of
connections based on the proximity of the old oﬃces. We then repli 
cated the stability estimations including additional variables reﬂecting
this fourth network layer. In these estimations, the variables associated
with previous proximity turn out not to be signiﬁcant, while the other
variables exhibit similar magnitudes to the above.
6. Welfare
Having established the importance of network externalities in indi 
vidual preferences, a natural next step is identifying the socially op 
timal assignment, and evaluating the mechanism implemented by the
45In fact, regression analysis using survey responses reveals that the only signif-
icant source of heterogeneity in preferences is associated with seniority levels with
respect to oﬃce size. Speciﬁcally, senior faculty exhibits a stronger preference for
large corner oﬃces, which represent only 10% of the oﬃces under consideration.
46However, the results do indicate a slightly stronger response to coauthors’
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school, as well as alternative variations of the serial dictatorship mech 
anism. In this section, we illustrate techniques for doing so.
The analysis in the previous section allowed us to determine the net 
work layers and the proximity notion that impact individuals’ utilities
the most. In this section we ﬁrst identify a pairwise stable assignment
that, under the estimated preferences, would increase overall eﬃciency
relative to the one implemented. We therefore provide a lower bound on
the welfare loss generated by the observed assignment. We also inspect
the trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and ‘fairness’ of outcomes across dif 
ferent classes of faculty. Finally, under some simplifying assumptions,
we estimate the welfare generated by commonly used variations of the
serial dictatorship mechanism in the presence of network externalities.
6.1. The First-Best Assignment. Given the utility speciﬁcation in 
troduced in the previous section, an eﬃcient assignment µ∗ must sat 
isfy (using our previous notation)
(4)
µ∗ ∈ argmaxµ∈Θ
 
f∈F uf(µ) = argmaxµ∈Θ
 
f∈F
 
Pµ(f) +
 L
l=1βlk(f,µ,l)
 
= argmaxµ∈Θ
 
f∈F
 L
l=1 βlk(f,µ,l),
where Θ is the set of all possible assignments, and the second equal 
ity follows from the fact that the utility derived from oﬃces’ physical
characteristics is homogeneous across agents.
In light of the preference estimation results in Section 5, we now
assume that the only links that matter to agents are those between
departmental colleagues and coauthors in local neighborhoods. Even
with this simplifying assumption, the problem of ﬁnding the most eﬃ 
cient assignment is still not trivial: there are |Θ| = 72! > 10103 possible
assignments and the problem is inherently combinatorial, so diﬀerential
techniques cannot be employed.47 As it turns out, the problem ﬁts into
the class of Quadratic Assignments Problems (QAP), ﬁrst described in
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) in the context of locating industrial
plants with spillovers and transportation costs. Speciﬁcally, let bff′ (a
generic entry in a symmetric (N×N) matrix B) be the overall intensity
of network externalities between any two agents f and f′ (obtained by
summing up the links present in the diﬀerent networks, weighted by
47We note that the subtlety of the network architectures makes this a more
intricate problem than others pertaining to eﬃcient design in the presence of com-
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their estimated relative importance β).48 Also, let hoo′ (a generic entry
in a symmetric (N × N) matrix H) be a variable that takes value 1 if
an oﬃce o neighbors an oﬃce o′, and 0 otherwise. Finally, an assign-
ment matrix X is an (N ×N) matrix, where each row and column are
made up of N − 1 entries of 0 and a single entry of 1, with element
xfo corresponding to whether oﬃce o is assigned to agent f; the row
and column restrictions guarantee a single assignment for each faculty
member, and one faculty member to each oﬃce. Let Π be the set of all
assignment matrices.
The problem of ﬁnding the most eﬃcient assignment µ∗ can therefore
be speciﬁed in the Koopmans Beckmann formulation as:49
max
X∈Π
N  
f=1
N  
f′=1
N  
o=1
N  
o′=1
bff′hoo′xfoxf′o′,
Note that the matrix BXHXT has generic element
 N
f′=1
 N
o′=1
 N
o=1 bff′xf′o′ho′oxf′o.
Thus, using the symmetry of H and changing summation order, the
trace of BXHXT is equal to the objective function above. Therefore,
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Quadratic Assignment Problem). Finding an eﬃcient
assignment µ∗ is a Quadratic Assignment Problem–that is, it is equiv-
alent to identifying a matrix X ∈ Π that maximizes tr
 
BXHXT 
,
where tr{ } is the trace operator.
The QAP has been shown to be NP hard; in fact, even the prob 
lem of ﬁnding an ε approximation is computationally complex.50 Full
solutions to this class of problems are still considered numerically in 
tractable for N > 30. We therefore assess a lower bound for the po 
tential eﬃciency gain by identifying an alternative pairwise stable as 
signment using an ant colony algorithm (see Dorigo, 1992 and Dorigo,
Di Caro, and Gambardella, 1999), which has been demonstrated to be
48Note that this formulation takes bilateral links as the de-facto networks. The
values appearing in the matrix B essentially identify the coeﬃcients {βl} in our
utility speciﬁcation, the utility ﬂows between members in the (bilateral) network.
49The generalized formulation of QAP allows for an arbitrary term cijlm in place
of bijhlm. For details see Çela (1998).
50The proof that the problem is NP-hard can be seen by reinterpreting the lo-
cations as a time sequence of visits to diﬀering cities, with bij representing the
distance between a city pair, and hlm assuming value 1 if l and m are sequential
time-periods. This reinterpretation gives the fairly well-known NP-hard Traveling
Salesman’s Problem. The complexity of an approximation of the QAP is demon-
strated in Sahni and Gonzalez (1976). They show that if an ε-approximation can
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eﬀective in ﬁnding optima of the QAP.51,52 This algorithm is discussed
in more detail in Appendix C.
Using speciﬁcation PS(iii) in Table 6 from Section 5, we consider
three combinations of coeﬃcients corresponding to the variables Coau-
thor Neighbor and Coauthor and Friend Neighbor relative to Depart-
ment Neighbor. The ﬁrst corresponds to the lower bounds of the es 
timated intervals: 3 and 6, respectively; The second corresponds to
the lower bounds of the conﬁdence intervals: 0.35 and 2.95; The third
approximates the midpoint of the estimated intervals: 3.75 and 8.
Figure 3 illustrates the most eﬃcient assignment found by the algo 
rithm under the ﬁrst combination of coeﬃcients, 3 and 6.53 The com 
parison with the observed assignment in Figure 2 suggests the potential
for more network clustering in the matching process. In fact, for this
combination of coeﬃcients, the algorithm identiﬁes a lower bound on
the potential network eﬃciency gain of 183%.54 An identical welfare
increase is generated when the coeﬃcients are the midpoints of the esti 
mated intervals. When the coeﬃcients correspond to the lower bounds
of the conﬁdence intervals, the generated network eﬃciency increase is
158%.
Given these results, we conclude that the assignment selected by the
serial dictatorship mechanism in place appears suboptimal. However,
we stress that the limitations of our data set force us to assume ho 
mogeneous preferences across faculty. The eﬃciency of the observed
assignment could, in principle, improve with respect to our estimates
51The eﬃciency gain we identify represents a lower bound on the potential eﬃ-
ciency gain only because, as is common in this literature, the most eﬃcient assign-
ment we identify represents a local maximum, but we are unable to tell whether it
is also global.
52We can also identify a slack upper bound for the problem using the properties
of the trace and the eigenvalues of B and H. Given the ordered eigenvalues of H
and B—(υ1 ≤     ≤ υN) and (ρ1 ≤     ≤ ρN), respectively—we can give a simple
upper bound on welfare since we have
tr
 
BXHXT 
≤
N  
i=1
υiρi
for any X ∈ Π. This points to an upper bound on the network gain of 270% to
337% across our three speciﬁcations for β.
53The most eﬃcient assignment is not unique. Indeed, notice that ﬂoors 5 and
7 are interchangeable as are ﬂoors 6 and 8.
54We note that despite the fact that friendship enters the utility speciﬁcation
only through Coauthor and Friend Neighbor, the number of friendship links in local
neighborhoods increases from 18 in the observed assignment to 32 in the best-found
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Figure 3. The Best Found Assignment
Floor 8
Floor 7
Floor 6
Floor 5
Floor 4
Coauthor and Friend Friend Coauthor
Note: Diﬀering shapes represent department aﬃliations; Circles research clusters;
Node shading represents seniority level, with white for seniors, and gray for juniors.
if individuals put diﬀerent weights on network externalities. For ex 
ample, if faculty members that care less about externalities tend to be
more senior, they may sort themselves toward better oﬃces at the cost
of less network links, allowing others to generate more high eﬃciency
links among themselves (however, as discussed in Section 5, allowing36 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
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Figure 4. Utility Cumulative Distribution, by Seniority
junior and senior faculty to put diﬀerent weights on network external 
ities, yields results similar to the homogeneous preferences case).
6.2. Fairness Properties. One aspect traditionally addressed by the
matching literature has to do with fairness (see, for instance, Chapter
7 in Moulin, 2003 for an overview). Namely, one might desire a rather
homogeneous division of welfare across diﬀerent classes of individuals.
Therefore, a natural question that arises is whether eﬃciency in our
context comes at the expense of fairness.
In our application, there are two obvious dimensions according to
which faculty can be classiﬁed: seniority and department aﬃliation. It
is interesting to compare faculty outcomes at diﬀerent seniority levels
and across diﬀerent departments under the observed assignment and
the best found one. Distributions over the assessed outcomes under
each assignment are presented in Figures 4 and 5.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4 illustrate the comparison between
seniors’ and juniors’ physical outcomes, evaluated according to theA FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 37
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Figure 5. Utility Cumulative Distribution, by Department
weights estimated in CL(i) for the physical oﬃce attributes.55 As can
be seen, the wedge between outcomes experienced by diﬀerent seniority
levels is substantially greater under the observed assignment relative to
the best found one. Panel (a) shows that in the observed assignment
the physical utility distribution of senior faculty ﬁrst order stochasti 
cally dominates that for the junior faculty. This is intuitive: senior fac 
ulty chose ﬁrst, and got better selections. Note that in Figure 2, white
nodes, corresponding to senior faculty, are located predominantly on
one side of the building, the more desirable western size. In contrast, in
the best found assignment, represented in Panel (b), the distributions
for juniors and seniors are much closer.
In terms of network utility, junior and senior faculty experience sim 
ilar outcomes under both assignments, as can be seen in panels (c)
and (d). Ultimately, in terms of seniority, there does not seem to be
55Note that eﬃciency levels remain the same if individuals on ﬂoors 5 and 7 or
ﬂoors 6 and 8 are exchanged. Such a switch could, however, aﬀect fairness levels (if
juniors and seniors are not uniformly distributed across ﬂoors). Hence, exchanges
of ﬂoors could, in principle, raise the similarity of outcomes in Panel (b).38 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
a trade oﬀ between fairness and eﬃciency. In fact, the best found as 
signment appears to generate more egalitarian outcomes in terms of
physical oﬃce attributes.
Figure 5 illustrates outcomes for faculty within diﬀerent departments
under the observed and best found assignments. Panels (a) and (b) sug 
gest that, with respect to department, there could be a tension between
eﬃciency and fairness. Indeed, under the best found assignment, the
physical utility distribution of the departments are ﬁrst order stochas 
tically ranked. The underlying reason for this is that, while eﬃciency
pushes same department faculty to be placed in proximity, this is likely
to result in individual departments dominating diﬀerent ﬂoors. Con 
sequently, departments occupying higher ﬂoors will experience greater
physical utility levels.56 Panels (c) and (d) suggest that, even in terms
of network utility, the best found assignment entails greater variance
in outcomes across departments.
6.3. Welfare Properties of the Serial-Dictatorship Mechanism.
Our results thus far allow the evaluation of diﬀerent mechanisms. In 
deed, our estimates from Section 5 provide individual utilities, while the
analysis of Section 6.1 provides a benchmark against which to compare
any mechanism in welfare terms. In this section, we consider a class
of variations of the mechanism implemented by the school. Namely,
we consider several natural re orderings of the faculty, and as is often
the case in standard implementations of serial dictatorship, we do not
allow for ex post swaps.
As before, assessing the welfare properties of these mechanisms by
calculating the corresponding Nash equilibria is computationally unfea 
sible. We therefore make simplifying assumptions on agents’ strategic
sophistication in predicting subsequent choices. In particular, we as 
sume that each agent believes that all successors will select the oﬃce
preferred according to its physical attributes.57
We simulate the following three versions of serial dictatorship: Ran-
dom Ordering, under which faculty are allocated a draft order at ran 
dom; Seniority-Random Ordering, in which higher seniority levels are
56The fact that eﬃcient outcomes imply more fairness across seniority levels
but less fairness across departments is robust to aggregating physical and network
utilities into an overall utility using the methodology presented in the next Section
6.3.
57This notion is reminiscent of the level-1 behavior described in the cognitive hi-
erarchy literature (see, e.g., Dahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995, Crawford, Costa-Gomez,
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given priority, and draft order within each seniority level is deter 
mined at random (as in the implemented mechanism); and Department-
Random Ordering, in which departments choose in sequence, and within
departments, members are ordered randomly.58
To compute the overall utilities obtained by these mechanisms, we
exploit the observed choices in our data as follows. We use the simpli 
ﬁed beliefs described above to generate, for each individual’s feasible
oﬃce at the time of choice, a projected ﬁnal assignment. Using the
estimates of PS(iii) to weight the relative importance of the network
attributes, we can therefore simulate the likelihood function for each
choice, and estimate the scale of the network components vis à vis the
physical ones by maximizing this likelihood. The estimated marginal
eﬀects of the network component on utility are reported as Network
Utility Scale in Table 7.
As in Section 6.1, Table 7 includes three speciﬁcations for the relative
network weights (derived from the results of PS(iii)), using the lower
bounds of the estimated intervals, the lower bounds of the conﬁdence
intervals, and the mid points of the estimated intervals. We name these
speciﬁcations S(i), S(ii), and S(iii), respectively. In each column, we
ﬁrst report the network weights used. The Lower Bound is the portion
of the utility derived from physical oﬃce attributes only. Since we as 
sume that faculty value oﬃces’ physical characteristics identically, this
value does not depend on the assignment chosen and represents a lower
bound on the overall utility obtained by any assignment. The remain 
ing percentages are all expressed relative to the relevant best found
assignment detailed in Section 6.1. Each mechanism’s performance is
measured in two ways: in terms of the network utility, and in terms of
the overall utility (the latter reported in square brackets and calculated
using the Network Utility Scale).
The best ordering we identify corresponds to individuals belong 
ing to the same department choosing in sequence. In particular, the
Department-Random Ordering obtains up to 54.5% of the maximal net 
work utility and 84.6% of the maximal overall utility level (see S(ii)).
However, the wedge between the maximal welfare generated by serial
dictatorship and the ﬁrst best assignment remains important. In fact,
even in S(ii), the best performance of the serial dictatorship mechanism
generates utility levels that approximately mid way between the lower
bound on utility levels (given by 66.2%) and the best found assignment
(100% by construction).
58Among all possible department orderings, we report results for the one gener-
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Table 7. Welfare Analysis of Serial Dictatorship
S(i) S(ii) S(iii)
Network Weights
Department 1.00 1.00 1.00
Coauthor 3.00 0.35 3.75
Coauthor and Friend 6.00 2.95 8.00
Estimates
Network Utility Scale (†) 7.3% 11.9% 5.9%
(1.5) (2.2) (1.2)
Lower Bound 67.8% 66.2% 69.2%
Simulations
Seniority Random Ordering 36.2% [79.5%] 40.3% [79.5%] 35.9% [80.3%]
(5.8) (5.6) (5.5)
Random Ordering 33.2% [78.5%] 37.8% [79.0%] 32.2% [79.2%]
(5.2) (5.6) (5.5)
Department Random Ordering 46.2% [82.7%] 54.5% [84.6%] 44.7% [83.0%]
(6.4) (6.8) (6.5)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses under estimates of network eﬀect; standard
deviations in the simulations. (†) Network Utility Scale is measured as an increase
in the oﬃces’ selection probability given an additional department link, as in Table
3.
As a robustness check, we have also conducted similar analyses with
more sophisticated beliefs. Speciﬁcally, we suppose that faculty mem 
bers believe that subsequent individuals select oﬃces under the as 
sumption that their followers will base their decision only using oﬃces’
physical characteristics (thereby adding another ‘level’ to the cognitive
process). The results are similar to the ones obtained with the de 
scribed, more naive, belief speciﬁcation.
7. Conclusion
We document an assignment protocol of faculty to oﬃces in which
locations (oﬃces) varied in physical characteristics. We elicited three
layers of network connections: institutional and choice based (coau 
thorship and friendship). Our data allow us to study the role of network
externalities.
Three main insights stand out. First, network externalities have
a crucial impact on behavior and ﬁnal outcomes in the assignment
process. Second, the diﬀerent network layers have unequal impactsA FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 41
on outcomes. Third, from a normative perspective, identifying the
relevant networks is important for the design of eﬃcient assignments.
From a methodological point of view, our study suggests the use 
fulness of a modiﬁed notion of stability for the estimation of network
externalities in assignment processes. The paper also contributes to
the empirical literature on social networks. Namely, we show how to
account for the relative impact of diﬀerent layers of peer connections.
We also point out techniques that can be employed to evaluate the wel 
fare performance of assignments in the presence of externalities. Ulti 
mately, this paper highlights the conceptual signiﬁcance and empirical
feasibility of considering network externalities in matching setups.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Since the number of possible assignments is ﬁnite, there exists a most
eﬃcient one. Let µ be the most utilitarian eﬃcient assignment. WeA FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 45
now show that µ is pairwise stable. Indeed, suppose that faculty f and
f′ form a blocking pair. That is, there exists some transfer t such that:
P
µ
f′
f (f) +
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ
f′
f ,l) + t ≥ Pµ(f) +
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ,l);
P
µ
f′
f (f′) +
L  
l=1
βlk(f
′,µ
f′
f ,l) − t ≥ Pµ(f′) +
L  
l=1
βlk(f
′,µ,l)
and at least one of the inequalities is strict. Since µ
f′
f (f) = µ(f′) and
µ
f′
f (f′) = µ(f), summing up these inequalities implies that:
(5)
δ ≡
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ
f′
f ,l)+
L  
l=1
βlk(f
′,µ
f′
f ,l)−
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ,l)−
L  
l=1
βlk(f
′,µ,l) > 0.
Suppose that under µ, in oﬃce µ(f), faculty f has k1,...kL connected
faculty from layers 1,...,L (including themselves), and, in oﬃce µ(f′),
faculty f has r1,...,rL faculty from layers 1,...,L. Then, after some
manipulation, Condition (5) can be written as:
(6) δ =
L  
l=1
βl (rl + r
′
l − kl − k
′
l + 2) > 0
Consider now the eﬀects on utilitarian eﬃciency from a shift from µ
to µ
f′
f . For each layer l, we need to take into account the changes (an
addition or reduction of one peer for the shift of f and the shift of f′)
for all members of that network layer other than f and f′. Using (6),
the overall eﬃciency gain is then
∆ =
L  
l=1
βl (rl + r
′
l − (kl − 1) − (k
′
l − 1)) + δ = 2δ > 0
in contradiction to µ being the most eﬃcient assignment. ￿46 M. BACCARA, A. IMROHOROGLU, A.J. WILSON, AND L. YARIV
Appendix B. The Ant Colony Algorithm
Ant Colony Algorithms are probabilistic search methods for opti 
mization in combinatorial problems, ﬁrst introduced by Dorigo (1992).
They are named after the natural process they emulate: in the task
of ﬁnding and retrieving food, ants deposit a pheromone trail along
the path between a new food source and their colony. Other ants are
attracted by these trails and follow them to the food source, leaving
their own trail as they go. Given some randomness in the ants’ be 
havior, and the fact that old pheromone deposits decay over time, the
shortest path ends up being chosen more frequently. The pheromones
act as a method of communication between the individuals, helping the
colony as a whole optimize. The algorithm utilizes a number of prob 
abilistic agents, the ‘ants,’ that make successive random assignments
within a graph. Assignments that are ranked highly by the objective
are reinforced through a larger likelihood of occurring in the future, a
process that Dorigo, Maniezzo, and Colorni (1996, DMC henceforth)
term autocatalytic—a self sustaining positive feedback process.
In our application, each faculty in F = {1,...,N} and each oﬃce in
O = {1,...,N} constitute nodes on a completely connected bipartite
graph. That is, each ‘faculty’ node f is connected to each ‘oﬃce’ node
o, and vice versa. Therefore, each edge is indexed by a faculty oﬃce
pair (f,o), which represents the assignment of faculty f to oﬃce o.
The algorithm describes a process in which a probability distribution
over the edges of the graph is used to generate M sample assignments.
The sample assignments are then assessed by the objective function,
and the probability distribution is updated to increase the likelihood
of better assignments.
The probability distribution is constructed from two matrices: a
pheromone matrix Ξ(t), which changes over the algorithm’s run, and
a ﬁxed matrix Ω, termed the heuristic. Each has a speciﬁc function
within the algorithm. The heuristic, Ω, provides an ex ante measure
for the desirability of each edge (f,o), and guides the assignments in the
early phase of the algorithm. The pheromone Ξ(t) encodes the infor 
mation learned during the algorithm’s run. At the outset, we start with
an initial distribution of the pheromone Ξ(0) =
 
ξf,o(0)
 
that assigns
a small equal level to all the edges in F ×O (i.e., for each faculty oﬃce
pair (f,o), ξf,o(0) = ε). We follow DMC in constructing the heuris 
tic as follows: Given the network connection matrix B, and the oﬃceA FIELD STUDY ON MATCHING WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 47
proximity matrix H, we deﬁne Ω = Bι(Hι)′.59 That is, the heuristic
for each pair (f,o) is given by ωf,o = (
 
f′∈F bff′)   (
 
o′∈O hoo′), the
product of the faculty member f’s total connection value and the oﬃce
o’s neighbors.60 As such, higher values in Ω are given to faculty oﬃce
pairs in which the oﬃce allows for many neighbors and the faculty
member has many connected colleagues.
We now outline the assignment algorithm in detail, given the heuris 
tic Ω and a particular starting level of the pheromone matrix Ξ(0). At
each iteration t ≥ 0, the algorithm carries out the following procedure.
(a) Ordering Randomization. Determine a random ordering of
faculty, {f1,...fN}.
(b) Faculty Assignment. For n = 1,..,N, assign each faculty
fn to a particular location on among the oﬃces still unassigned, i.e.,
on ∈ On, where O1 ≡ O, and On ≡ On−1 \ {on−1}. The probability of
a particular location o ∈ On being chosen for faculty f is given by
g
t
fn,o =
ξ
ρ
f,o(t) ωσ
f,o  
k∈On ξ
ρ
f,kωσ
f,k
,
where ξf,o(t) is the generic element of the pheromone level matrix in
period t, Ξ(t), and ρ and σ are parameters that control the weight given
to the heuristic and the pheromone levels, respectively, in determining
the location probabilities.
(c) Ant iteration. At each iteration t ≥ 0, steps (a) and (b) are
repeated M times (where each run represents a particular ‘ant’). Each
repetition generates a candidate assignment   µ
t
m.
(d) Pairwise stability. For all n = 1,...,N, m = 1,..,M, we then
use our notion of pairwise stability to improve the candidate assign 
ment   µ
t
m through a local search.61 Formally, the local search starts at
  µ
t
m, draws a random faculty pair (f,f′) and checks if an oﬃce swap
(with transfers) would be mutually proﬁtable. If it is, the pair swap
is implemented and the pairwise stability process starts over with the
new assignment
 
  µ
t
m
 f′
f . If no oﬃce swap is proﬁtable, the process
59From Section 6.1, recall that B describes the overall intensity of network ex-
ternalities between any two agents f and f′ and H describes the proximity of any
two oﬃces o and o′.
60In our program, we actually used the normalized heuristic matrix   Ω = Ω
ω,
where ω was the average entry of Ω.
61Note that Proposition 1 guarantees, given our assumptions, that any bilateral
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selects another faculty pair (f,f′) from those remaining. The local 
search algorithm ends when the assignment is pairwise stable.62 The
beneﬁt of adding this step is that the local search algorithm is fairly
quick, and can move quite far from the initial candidate assignment
  µ
t
m, taking the local network structure into account more explicitly.
The initial placements are structured by the ant colony probabilities,
so assignments ‘closer’ to previous local maxima are more likely to oc 
cur, but the algorithm’s “deviations” are now used in a more eﬃcient
way.63 The denote the resulting assignment by µt
m.
(e) Welfare Computation. The value for the assignment resulting
from step (d), µt
m, is calculated according to the aggregate welfare
function, given by
W(µ
t
m) =
 
f∈F
uf(µ
t
m) =
N  
f=1
L  
l=1
βlk(f,µ,l))
where, according to the notation used in Section 5, k(f,µ,l) is the
number of faculty from network layer l, l = 1,...,L that are in f’s
neighborhood under the assignment µ, and βl is the estimated coeﬃ 
cient associated with network layer l. Let µ∗ be the current best found
assignment. If W(µt
m) > W(µ∗), we set µ∗ = µt
m.
(f) Updating the pheromone matrix Ξ(t) between t and t+1.
The algorithm changes the distribution from which assignments are
drawn by making the assignments that generate high welfare levels
more likely to occur. In the simplest formulation, this is achieved by
adding the term γW(µt
m) (where γ is a chosen scale parameter) to the
pheromone level of all edges used in each assignment. More speciﬁcally,
for every edge (f,o), we calculate the new pheromone level according
to
ξf,o(t + 1) = λξf,o(t) + γ
 M
i=1 W(µ
t
m)1{µ
t
m(f) = o},
where λ is the decay parameter of pheromones. If we write the assign 
ment function µ as an assignment matrix X(µ) (so that X(µ)f,o = 1
whenever µ(f) = o, and 0 otherwise), this has the matrix form:
Ξ(t + 1) = λΞ(t) + γ
 M
i=1 W(µ
t
m)X(µ
t
m).
62Because any proﬁtable swap strictly increases total welfare, and the globally
best assignment is pairwise stable, this process ends in a ﬁnite number of iterations
at a pairwise-stable assignment.
63In particular, simulation evidence suggests that in lower-dimensional problems,
the ant-colony algorithm with local search is better at ﬁnding global maxima than
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The process places higher weight on highly eﬃcient assignments (i.e.,
assignments that generate more network connections).
Alternatively, it is possible to reward each edge via its contribution
to total welfare—that is, we could instead deposit
 L
l=1 βlk(f,µ,l))
pheromones on each utilized edge (f,µ(f)). This process is called
an Ant-Quantity algorithm, as opposed to the previous speciﬁcation,
which is known as an Ant-Cycle algorithm. DMC provide simulation
results suggesting better performance from the Ant Cycle speciﬁcation
in the Traveling Salesman Problem, attributing the eﬀect to the higher
saliency for global placements in the latter stages of an algorithm’s run.
One ﬁnal variation on the procedure is called an Elitist Ant Colony,
in which we follow the above algorithm with an additional pheromone
component derived from the best assignment µ∗ found over the M rep 
etitions. That is, the pheromone update process is given by
Ξ(t + 1) = λΞ(t) + γ
 
m
∗W(µ
t
m)X(µ
∗) +
 M−m∗
i=1 W(µ
t
m)X(µ
t
m)
 
,
where m∗ is a parameter representing the number of elitist ants who
follow the best found assignment.
(g) End Condition. Since for any two consecutive periods the
objective W(µ∗) is likely to remain the same, a convergence condi 
tion cannot easily be used as an end condition. Consequently, the
end condition for the algorithm is either a certain number of itera 
tions T, or a limit on the run time. However, during the algorithm’s
run it is sometimes necessary to reset the process. This is because the
pheromone matrix can converge in a way that does not leave enough
variation to the stochastic assignment process. One way to avoid this
is to reduce the parameter ρ, keeping in mind that, as we do that, the
positive feedback process becomes less important.64
64DMC recommends setting ρ = 1, and σ = 5 and λ = 0.5. However, in general,
one may have to experiment with diﬀerent parameters to uncover potential trade-
oﬀs. Decreasing λ leads to a greater ability to forget previous assignments, but
decreasing it too much results in a large variance in the path of the algorithm.
Increasing ρ leads to a greater focus on the pheromone process and less on the
heuristic one, which has negative implications in the early iterations, where we
want to use the heuristic to guide search. Similarly, increasing σ places greater
weight on the heuristic, which is beneﬁcial in early iterations, but reduces the
global search properties in later iterations. In many ways, the algorithm provides
an interesting starting point from which one can set up search procedures tailored
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In our speciﬁc application, a problem arising with the procedure is
that location probabilities for faculty members are independent. Ide 
ally, we would like to probabilistically re sample the location for a de 
ﬁned group. However, the algorithm internalizes the social network
structure only through the objective W and the heuristic matrix Ω,
and samples deviations of individual members independently. While
we added Step (d) to the DMC procedure to mitigate this limitation,
more complicated structures might allow for correlated locations of
small groups within the innermost loop.
The main advantages of the ant colony algorithm are its fairly robust
global search properties and relatively simple implementation. In ad 
dition, the algorithm seems ﬂexible and easy to customize to particular
applications, for example by treating pheromone levels in alternative
ways as illustrated above. The main drawbacks are the large number
of parameters that need to be speciﬁed by the user.